On the situation in Donbass by the evening of September
17th.
1. Strategically, the situation didn't change much. The intercepted communications of the junta military groups that tried to encircle Gorlovka created a solid reserve for major purely military successes if the military action will transition to a more active stage. It is not possible to speak about a complete encirclement yet, but at current tendencies one of the groups may end up in a full-fledged cauldron within 2-3 days. Overall, the enemy, having transitioned to the formation of strike military fists, cannot maintain the needed density of the front on all of its breadth. Thus, even despite its numerical advantage over the NAF in headcount and in the number of armored vehicles, the junta has substantial weaknesses in its front lines: the location between Mariupol and Volnovakha, the front to the north of Lugansk, the gaps between groups that attack Yasinovataya and hold the Debalcevo-Soledarsk protrusion. Significant forces of the junta are involved in holding obviously disadvantageous protrusions that simply ask to be cut. The current announcements by the NAF that supposedly "the largest encirclement of the war was created" are of course an exaggeration. The group of 2000-2500 soldiers with severed communications is clearly inferior to both the South Cauldron 1.0 and the Ilovaysk-Amvrosiyevka cauldron. Nevertheless, this is an indication that the junta continues to get into encirclements just like it used to do. The quality of its military management even during the supposedly "peaceful" period leaves much to be desired.
2. With respect to concentration, the main forces of the junta are already deployed into Donbass. The junta cannot grow the group substantially yet. Taking the planned rotation of the detachments and the combat capable units that were pulled into the front into account, the junta can reinforce its group only by throwing restored battalion-tactical groups of previously routed detachments into action. However, their combat qualities appear quite dubious due to large losses in personnel and materiel. In essence, absent the 4-th wave of mobilization, the junta cannot substantially increase the headcount of its group, which remains approximately on the level of early July of 2014. Considering the failure of the previous 3 waves of mobilization, the possible results of the 4-th also trigger certain skepticism. The junta, of course, isn't close to the limiting values of its mobilization potential, but it is already experiencing serious difficulties. All of this is aggravated by materiel issues: by various estimates, the junta lost about 60-70% of materiel present in Donbass (and the worst thing for the junta is that more than 220 armored vehicles of varying degree of combat readiness ended up being captured by the NAF, which already put between a quarter and a third of captured trophies into action). Of course, there are still many tanks, IFVs, SPH, and MLRS in warehouses and repair facilities, but reinforcements in August and September couldn't compensate for huge losses. The attempts of getting materiel from NATO countries and the attempts to buy back the vehicles that were shipped on international defense contracts are supposed to close the gap in materiel that was formed. Ukraine continues to reap the fruits of its horrible looting of Soviet military legacy.
3. The situation of Donetsk airport remains the same. The junta holds it despite the fact that the NAF blockaded it once again. The junta systematically shells the militia positions using tanks and cannons. In retaliation, the militia pile shells and rockets on the airport. Absence of high calibers here prevents smoking the enemy out of the branched system of underground and concrete facilities, which allow the enemy to protect its manpower. Nevertheless, materiel losses and supply issues lead to the attempts to unblock the airport and to push new forces in there. Some of these attempts lead to heavy losses, when the breaking troops fall under concentrated artillery fire by the NAF. On the other hand, there are also the facts of breakthroughs that happened during the "strange armistice", which were lately announced by Strelkov. To a reasonable question of why would Strelkov know about all of these events, I remind that his field commanders are engaged there even up to now, starting from general Petrovsky, so Strelkov knows perfectly well what's going on at the front. Regarding the airport, it is necessary to mention the announcement from the junta media that suggested about certain negations in which the junta supposedly proposed to surrender the airport to the NAF in exchange for the retreat of the NAF from Mariupol by 5 kilometers. A somewhat strange proposal, considering the stubborness with which the junta is clinging to the airport. But perhaps the necessity of keeping it became dubious lately, so they tried to exchange it for some operational benefits on other locations. Overall, this variant remained purely speculative for now.
Source: Colonel Cassad 17-09-2014
