(Written 6th September 2014)
The ceasefire agreement is the subject of intense
discussion and has clearly left some people unhappy. I will make a few
quick observations here before returning more fully to this subject later when
I am under less time pressure than I am at present:
1. The ceasefire has been forced on Poroshenko and the
junta as a result of (1) the disastrous military situation the junta now finds
itself in and (2) the refusal of the NATO/EU powers to intervene militarily on
his behalf to redress the balance. The last was again clearly reiterated
by Obama at the NATO summit yesterday when he publicly refused even to supply
the junta with weapons (NB: we should not take that seriously - weapons have
already been supplied on a significant scale but clearly even the outward
appearance of involvement through token public weapons transfers is being ruled
out). Incidentally Obama's talk about the importance of Article 5 of the
NATO Charter was intended to underline this point. Obama brought up
Article 5 not to "reassure the Baltic States" - which are not
being threatened and do not therefore need this reassurance- but to underline
to Kiev the point that as the Ukraine is not part of NATO it is not entitled to
military help from NATO.
2. The ceasefire agreement announced yesterday has not
been published but it gives the strong impression of being a purely technical,
temporary document for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It is
unlikely it will hold for very long. Either it will be replaced by a more
permanent agreement or the fighting will resume
3. The most important point about the ceasefire
agreement is not its terms but that following Putin's refusal to
"agree" a ceasefire with Poroshenko he was obliged to agree it with the
NAF (see below on this Page). This is something Poroshenko, the junta and
the Maidan movement have up to now adamantly refused to do. By
negotiating with the NAF and coming to an agreement with them on a substantive
issue namely a ceasefire the junta has been forced to acknowledge that the NAF
are not merely "terrorists" but are parties to a conflict and
therefore people the junta must negotiate with.
4. The DPR/LPR have won a decisive military victory so
that their survival is no longer in doubt. Those who worry that the junta
will use the ceasefire to rebuild its army in order to resume its offensive
disregard
(1) the fact that the junta's attempt to achieve a
military victory at a time when the military odds were overwhelmingly in its
favour has ended in disastrous failure. The NAF is now an immeasurably
stronger and better organised force than it was in April when the "anti
terrorist operation" began or in July when the junta launched its great
offensive in order to destroy it. This really has been a case of
Nietzsche's famous dictum that "what doesn't kill you makes you
stronger". If the junta could not defeat the NAF in the period April
to July it cannot do so now;
(2) the junta is in no position to relaunch an offensive
on anything like the scale of July any time soon. Not only is the junta's
military in no condition to resume the offensive but the catastrophic economic
situation and the onset of winter absolutely precludes it. If the
ceasefire holds it is much more likely that it will be the NAF that will
continue to grow in strength as it gains more recruits, has more time to train
them and repairs and absorbs into its arsenal the cornucopia of weapons it has
captured;
(3) Russia will not allow the DPR/LPR to be destroyed.
The junta's and NATO's claims that the Ukrainian military were defeated
by the Russian army rather than the NAF are untrue but actually now benefit the
NAF because they have established the perception that Russia will in any crisis
intervene militarily in order to save them. In politics perception is 90%
of the battle and the perception that Russia will not let the NAF be defeated
or let the DPR/LPR be destroyed will determine decision making in Washington,
Brussels and Kiev from now on.
5. Since there is no possibility now that the DPR/LPR
will be destroyed the political initiative now rests with them. They have
made absolutely clear what their objectives are (1) total withdrawal of all
Ukrainian troops from their territory and (2) full independence from Kiev.
As I have previously said Putin supports (1) and is slowly coming round
to (2) (see below on this Page). Poroshenko is of course rejecting both.
Days ago he was also rejecting demands for a ceasefire and talks with the
NAF and he has now been forced to concede both. It is no longer within
his power to deny the NAF's further demands and the fact that he has been
forced to say publicly that he rules them out shows that he knows it.
6. None of this course means that the junta will not try
to use the ceasefire to improve its position on the ground. The fact that
Poroshenko has been defeated does not mean he is reconciled to the fact.
Were he to become so such authority as he still has in Kiev would melt
away. It is precisely because Poroshenko cannot bring himself to accept
defeat that I expect him to do everything he can to try to reinforce his
position by misusing the ceasefire for that purpose. It is for that
reason I expect the ceasefire to be only temporary and to be followed by a
renewed NAF offensive before long.
7. I suspect what disappoints most people about the
ceasefire (see the comments made about it for example by Gleb Bazov and Colonel
Cassad) is that it appears to rule out the option of an NAF march on Kiev to
overthrow the junta. However the reality is that this option had been
ruled out some time ago as was made clear by Zakharchenko at his press
conference of 2 weeks ago (see my discussion at the time on this Page).
The whole tone and content of Zakharchenko's comments since he was
confirmed as the DPR's leader is that the NAF is fighting a purely defensive
war to defend its people and territory. I appreciate that this is
disappointing for many people but there it is.
8. Lastly and by way of postscript I would add
(1) the decision not to march on Kiev is surely the
reason behind the dismissal of Strelkov who made his intention to march on Kiev
clear. It is now universally believed that Strelkov's dismissal was
engineered by Moscow as part of its political strategy for the Ukraine.
Whilst this is no doubt true I suspect this underestimates the strength
of feeling on this issue within the Donbas itself with many (most?) people
there fighting to defend their families and homes and unwilling to march on a
Kiev they no longer want to have anything to do with. I would add in passing
that the extraordinary publicity Strelkov was getting cannot have failed to
rile some of the other commanders who must have felt their own contribution was
being overlooked. I suspect Strelkov's panicked reaction on 9th August
2014 to the junta's attack on Krasny Luch and his unjustified criticism of the
town's defenders was for these people the final straw.
(2) the now certain secession of the Donbas is not the
end of the Ukraine's crisis. That is still in its early stages and has
very far to go. At best we are at the end of this crisis's beginning.
That however is a big issue to discuss when I have more time.
SOME POINTS CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE
Since the ceasefire was announced criticism has mounted
with more criticism from people like Gubarev. I understand some of this
criticism but I think it would help to explain some points.
Criticism is now focusing on two specific issues:
(1) The protocol of the ceasefire agreement, which is in
Russian only.
and
(2) Complaints that the ceasefire benefits the junta
more than the NAF and is at the very least premature.
In my opinion (1) is simply wrong. There is much
more to be said for (2). However there are points to be made even about
(2).
The Protocol
Before discussing the Protocol in detail I want to say
that this is in my opinion an essentially academic discussion. The
wording of the Protocol does not bear the weight people are attaching to it if
only because those involved in the conflict will interpret it in their own way.
I merely discuss this issue because others do.
1. The first point to understand about the Protocol is
that it originates from a forum, the Tripartite Contact Group, that was
supposedly set up to "implement" Poroshenko's (non) peace plan.
The NAF is not formally a member of the Contact Group. Its
members are the OSCE, Russia and the Ukraine. The Contact Group
"invited" the NAF representatives to attend and provided a venue for
discussions between the junta and the NAF, which was useful for agreeing a
ceasefire. However the Protocol is in no sense a final settlement
agreement. That is postponed pending the "national dialogue"
the Protocol refers to.
2. The Protocol is a technical document. If one
ignores the language of the Protocol (deriving from the Contact Group's origins
as a body to "implement" Poroshenko's (non) peace plan) and focuses
instead on its content it is clear that it is the NAF that has gained most from
it. Specifically
(1) It has obtained a "bilateral ceasefire"
something it has been seeking since April. Please note that the key word
is "bilateral". Poroshenko's previous ceasefire was unilateral
which meant he could end it whenever he wanted to and that he did not recognise
the NAF by declaring it. What "bilateral" means is that the
Ukraine now acknowledges the NAF as a party to the conflict and is negotiating
with it. As I have previously argued Poroshenko did everything he could to
avoid this and tried to agree a ceasefire with Putin instead of with the NAF.
Putin said no.
The word "bilateral" incidentally also means
that Kuchma's status is no longer in question. The junta had previously
pretended that he was not representing it. Since Kuchma negotiated the
ceasefire, which is "bilateral", and since the junta is bound by what
he agreed, the fiction that Kuchma does not represent the junta is over and he
is confirmed as the junta's representative in negotiations with the NAF.
(2) the Protocol commits the junta to a total amnesty
and an exchange of prisoners. Quite apart from the obvious human
considerations by definition this again recognises the NAF as a party to the
conflict since the people so amnestied can no longer be criminals or
"terrorists".
(3) the Protocol reproduces language drawn from the 17th
April 2014 Geneva Statement about the dissolution of "illegal
groups". Note however that in light of (1) and (2) since the junta
now recognises the NAF as a party to the conflict it cannot in logic any longer
claim in international law that the NAF is an "illegal group".
Already the NAF leadership is treating this part of the Protocol as referring
to the various paramilitary groups controlled by people like Kolomoisky and
Right Sector.
(4) Russia is a signatory of the Protocol. This is
crucial. The US and EU by contrast are not signatories to the Protocol.
They have been completely cut out of the negotiations. The fact
that the Protocol is only in Russian and that there is no official translation
of it into any other language (apparently not even Ukrainian) is a significant
fact in itself. The long weeks of February to July when the Russians
negotiated fruitlessly with the US and EU are over. Since Russia is a signatory
of the Protocol it is a party to it. Since the US and EU are not
signatories to the Protocol they are not parties to it. Its signature
gives Russia grounds to act if the terms of the Protocol are breached.
Russia has not had clear cut grounds to act up to now, As a party
to the Protocol Russia is in effect its guarantor and it now does.
3. The part of the Protocol that is causing the most
criticism are the sections that refer to "decentralisation" and to
local elections happening under a Ukrainian law for
"decentralisation".
(1) The point to understand about these sections is that
the Protocol does not present itself as a final political settlement of the
conflict. That in theory depends on the "inclusive national
dialogue" referred to in the Protocol (wording that also ultimately
originates with the 17th April 2014 Geneva Statement). Zakharchenko and
Plotnitsky immediately following their signing of the Protocol made clear that
the NAF's objective remains full independence. Zakharchenko has said the
same today (8th September 2014).
(2) The fact that Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky issued
their statement immediately after the Protocol was signed (but before it was
published) refutes claims by people such as Gubarev that they did not know what
they were signing when they signed the Protocol but that they merely signed
whatever was put in front of them. On the contrary it is clear that they
wanted to make their position unambiguously clear precisely because they did
not want their intentions to be misconstrued by the language of the Protocol.
(3) The point here is that the Protocol provides for
elections to local bodies of power which because they would happen in
accordance with a Ukrainian law the Ukraine would be legally obliged to
recognise. It is a foregone conclusion that these elections if and when
they happen will be won by the NAF. If so since the Ukraine is legally
obliged to recognise the elections it is also legally obliged to recognise
their outcome (the "international community" would be as well).
(4) What this section of the Protocol therefore means is
that the Ukraine not only now recognises the NAF as a party to a conflict but
once the elections are out of the way will also be legally obliged to recognise
the NAF as the political leader of the Donbas.
4. Having made these points, let me now make the key
point: the Protocol is in my opinion a total red herring. The Protocol is
not a contract or a treaty. There is no court or tribunal that will
arbitrate on the meaning of its words. All the sides will construe it as
they wish. The junta will not of course construe it as I have done and
nor will its western backers even though my interpretation is undoubtedly the
correct one. The junta will continue to call the NAF "terrorists" and
will continue to deny they are the representatives of the Donbas whether they
win an election or not. Certainly the junta will not recognise an
election the NAF wins or any declaration of independence the NAF makes.
For what it's worth in my opinion there is little chance of the terms of
such an election being agreed upon or such an election taking place whilst the
Donbas remains part of the Ukraine.
5. I have laboured the point about the meaning of the
Protocol not because I attach the slightest importance to this question but
because others do and because it is being suggested that Zakharchenko and
Plotnitsky somehow signed away the NAF's position when they signed the
Protocol. In terms of what the Protocol actually says that is simply not
the case. Having said this I think the Protocol will before long be a
forgotten document left to collect dust in some unvisited archive as events
move beyond it.
Ceasefire benefits the Junta
This seems to me a far more powerful criticism.
However I would make the following points:
(1) I will say straight away that I think this criticism
has merit. The NAF would surely have been in a better position looking
forward if Mariupol and Debraltsevo had been recaptured. As it is there is
bound to be argument over the next few weeks and months about the status of
Mariupol especially.
(2) I cannot believe the NAF leaders did not realise
this when they agreed the ceasefire. However having demanded a ceasefire
for months they obviously felt once the junta offered one that they had no
realistic option but to agree. I would rather that they had not and that
things had turned out differently but then I am not in a position to second
guess their decisions or to know why they made the decision that they did.
Doubtless Russian pressure played its part but one should not overlook
the factor of war weariness in the Donbas itself. Possibly the NAF
leaders were concerned that the population of the Donbas and possibly some of
the NAF fighters might not understand or be happy if the war was prolonged
further when a ceasefire was being offered. I would point out that there
have been no mass protests from people in the Donbas opposing the ceasefire
since it was declared and the NAF troops (apart from some commanders) seem to
accept it. The one possibility I do exclude is that Zakharchenko and
Plotnitsky are fools or traitors. I have watched Zakharchenko and I am
sure he is neither.
(3) It is important anyway not to over dramatise the
problems the arguably premature end to the fighting will cause. Just 3
weeks ago the very existence of the NAF and of the DPR/LPR was in doubt.
Lugansk was suffering from a humanitarian crisis and both Lugansk and
Donetsk were threatened with encirclement.
(4) That danger has gone. The junta instead of
achieving a military victory has suffered a decisive defeat. NATO has
refused to help the junta. Despite desperate attempts by the junta to get
at least token NATO support through publicly admitted (as opposed to covert)
arms supplies even that request has been refused. The US/EU has failed
even to provide additional economic support. For all the brave talk at
the recent EU and NATO summits the reality is NATO and the EU have cut the
junta off. Meanwhile the Ukrainian economy is in freefall with Russian
gas and Donbas coal no longer available, output plunging, the currency collapsing
and foreign exchange reserves draining away The vice meanwhile is
tightening. The very latest reports say the Russians are quietly telling
European states thinking of sending gas to the Ukraine through the (bogus and
illegal) "reverse flow" scheme that they may have their own gas
supplies reduced if they do.
(5) Any idea that the latest redeployments are going to
change the situation decisively in the junta's favour look in the light of this
frankly alarmist. In truth these deployments look to me like further examples
of the junta's perennial tendency to reinforce failure by sending troops to
places like Mariupol and Debratselvo that are no longer defendable.
(6) The NAF made absolutely clear again today that they
want all the junta's military units withdrawn from their territory. As I
said previously (see below on this Page) Putin now supports this demand.
If the junta does not withdraw its troops a renewed NAF offensive to
drive them out looks inevitable. Indeed the NAF said as much
today.
(7) I would repeat what I have said previously. In
my opinion in military terms a prolonged pause will strengthen the NAF
militarily more than the junta. I appreciate many others take a different
view. However the NAF now has more time to consolidate its gains (some
people were worrying not so long that it was overextending itself), to attract
more recruits (easier to do now it is winning) and to absorb the vast quantity
of heavy weapons it has captured. A renewed NAF offensive when it comes
will be more powerful than the one we saw in August. In its weakened
state the junta's military will struggle to resist it. Following its
defeat and against the backdrop of the economic crisis and the coming of winter
the junta's ability to renew the offensive on anything like the scale we saw in
July is surely for the time being non existent.
Conclusion
The key lesson of the last few weeks is that the NAF can
no longer be defeated, that Russia is now involved, that the US/EU are no
longer involved in any meaningful way and that the junta having been defeated
and facing an economic crisis is left facing the NAF and Russia by itself.
In the Ukraine it is unwise to count on anything but the balance in this
conflict has now shifted decisively. I do not see how that will change.
For what it's worth that is also the assessment in Britain. The
mood here in the news media is one of humiliation and failure.
Source: The Vineyard of the Saker 09-09-2014
